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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
A.MERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSO-
~:tATJON, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
\\iA\NE T. BLOMQUIST and RUTHE. 
Bi~Ol\IQUIST, his wife, ZIONS SAV-
l'.''GS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a cor-
!'( :·at10n, JOSEPH E. NELSON an d 
PEOPLE'S FINANCE & THRIFT, a cor-
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
10,856 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Suit by American Savings & Loan Association 
to foreclose a real estate mortgage on residence of 
Wayne T. Blomquist and Ruth E. Blomquist. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Court at extensive pretrial discussions had 
resolved all issues, except one, as matters of law and 
had set up by its amendment to pretrial order the 
jury question of whether respondent by its letter of 
December 14, 1964, did in fact waive any existing 
defaults by appellants. At a further conference held 
between Court and counsel the day of the trial, the 
Court determined that there was no question of fact 
1 
I 
i 
to submit to the jury. The Court there . 
1
. 
h d h . upon d1~ I C arge t e JUry panel and granted resp d "' 
. d on ent a 
JU gment of foreclosure of the mortgage in th 
t f . d e na. ure o summary JU gment or judgment h 
pleadings. on t e 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of h 
lower Court entitling it to accelerate the unp:i~ ' 
mortgage debt and granting judgment of foreclosur 
. d t sustame . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not have serious disagreement 
with the statement of facts set forth in appellants' , 
brief as far as the statement goes. However, since 
1 
this case was decided by the lower Court as a matt€r 
of law on facts which were undisputed, it is felt 
a more detailed statement of facts should be pre· 
sented. 
Appellants are indebted to respondent on a note . 
and mortgage (Exhibits P-1 and P-2). Appellants I 
were late in making most of the monthly payments r 
due on the loan (R. 20, 25-26, 122) and pursuant to 
the terms of the note, respondent assessed and 
attempted to collect late charges of $5.94 on each 
payment made more than 20 days late (R. 122 and 
Exhibit P-14). Appellants ignored and refused to 
pay these late charges (Exhibits .P-4, P-~ .and P-14). f 
That together with and m add1t10n to the 
monthly payment on principal and interest on the 
2 
note, appellants by the terms of the mortgage, were 
~·equired to pay to respondent a monthly installment, 
as estimated by respondent, to be accumulated for 
Jayment of taxes and insurance (Exhibits P-2 and ~-4). Respondent increased this monthly payment 
$~.00 per month effective December 15, 1963, to 
JJick up deficiencies in the reserve account and be-
1 
cause of increased property taxes which went from 
$299.88 for 1962 to $307.72 for 1963 to $354.76 for 
1964. Appellants refused to pay this $2.00 per 
month increase and disputed respondent's right to 
make the increase (R. 19, Exhibits P-4 and P-14). 
On December 14, __ !_9-64, respondent made de-
'.1JaEd upon appellants by letter to bring the account 
cErrent by paying the following amounts (Exhibit 
P-4): 
November 15th payment ________________ $149.00 
11 payments short $2.00 each __________ 22.00 
(Tax and insurance escrow) 
14 unpaid late fees at $5.94 ____________ 83.16 
Total Demanded ______________ $254.16 
In that letter respondent stated that it would not 
accept a partial payment and that if payment were 
made after December 25, 1964, it would also be 
necessary to include December 15th, 1964, payment. 
Appellants tendered payment of $147.00 by 
check (Exhibit D-8) to respondent sometime between 
December 21, 1964, as contended by appellants (R. 
132) and December 28, 1964, as contended by re-
3 
spondent (R. 91). In any event, this tend ' 
I h er was for ess t an the $254.16 demanded since it di"d . 
Id ~~ cu e any of the 14 accrued late charges or the $29 d h ... 0() 
u$
2
n erphayments to t e escrow fund and was also 
.00 s ort for the current payment. · 
On December 28, 1964, respondent refused the 1 
tender and returned the check with respondent's 
letter (Exhibit P-5) which stated the amount tend~ ' 
ered was incorrect and referred to respondent's let-
ter of December 14, 1964, for the amount required to 
bring the loan current through November 15, 1964. 
Appellants again tendered to respondent this 
same check representing payment of $147.00 on this 
loan on January 6, 1965. Respondent once again 
refused the tender and turned the check with re-
spondent's letter of January 6, 1965 (Exhibit P-6) 
which stated that partial payment would not be 
accepted and that respondent must have remittance 
in full to bring the loan current and setting forth 1 
the amount necessary to bring the loan current and 
ref erring to prior letters This letter stated "which 
must reach our office immediately if additional ex-
pense and inconvenience are to be eliminated." The 
amount demanded in this letter on this loan was ·1 
$409.10, which amount included the December 15, 
1964, monthly installment, and a late charge on that 
payment making 15 late fees in all which had been 
incurred and remained unpaid and also included 
the $22.00 to make up the prior payments which were 
$2.00 short for tax and insurance reserves. 
4 
Appellants tendered this same check represent-
ing payment of $147.00 on this loan a third time on 
January 8, 1965, which tendered again ignored the 
accrued late fees, the shortage in the reserve account, 
and which was still $2.00 short of the then monthly 
payment of $149.00 due November 15, 1964, and did 
not include the December 15, 1964, payment. 
This tender was refused by respondent a third 
time and the check was returned to appellants in a 
letter from respondent's attorney (Exhibit P-7) 
elated January 8, 1965, which letter gave notice to 
the appellants that respondent had elected to declare 
and had declared+he full amount of the mortgage 
debt due and payable pursuant to the provisions of 
the note and mortgage and which letter gave appel-
lants thirty days to pay off the loan. 
At the time the $147.00 was first tendered, the 
1964 general property taxes had been paid by re-
spondent, which payment required respondent to use 
$44.07 of its own funds (R. 94, 119-120). 
Also, at the time the tenders were made, the 
November 15, 1964, payment and the December 15, 
1964, payment were due. The amount of these pay-
ments was $149.00 each made up of $118.75 prin-
cipal and interest and the balance toward reserves 
for taxes and insurance ( R. 90). 
Respondent, pursuant to the terms of the mort-
gage, to preserve the lien of the mortgage, in addi-
tion to the payment of $44.07 toward the 1964 
5 
general property taxes, paid the following 1 
. th . f a111ount1 w1 its own unds: $376.96 on November 00 
19 
.. ' 
0 , fo 
for general property taxes for 1965 $372 93 ,: ' 1 
' · on l\(1. 
vember 30, 1966, for general property taxes for 
1966, $38. 70 ?n Fe~rua.ry 25, 1965, to Salt Lakf 
Suburban Samtary D1stnct No. 1 for service char , 
$57.15 on March 4, 1965, to Salt Lake County Tr~~:· I 
urer to redeem sale for Salt Lake Suburban Sanitai:\· 
District No. 1 service charges, $43.40 on July 1·~ 
1965, for fire insurance premium and $60.0(1 r~; 
September 13, 1966, for fire insurance premium 
(R. 93, 94, 119, 120). \Vhile respondenthasnotmarle ' 
demand on appellants for reimbursement~ neithPi 
have appellants made any offer to pay these items. 
Subsequent to the letter of January 8, 1965, 
from respondent's attorney, appellants made tenders 
1 
which were sufficient to bring the installments cur. 
rent. These tenders were refused by respondent for 
the reason that it had declared the full amount of 
the mortgage debt due (appellants' proposed Ex. 
hibits D-9, D-10, and D-12). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING 
THE JURY AND GRANTING JUDGMENT OF 
FORECLOSURE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The first pretrial of this case was before Judge 
Hanson on October 1, 1965 (R. 64, 65); subsequently 
a trial was commenced before Judge Faux Septem· 
6 
ber :26, 1966, which resulted in a mis-trial because 
of misconduct of appellant Wayne T. Blomquist. The 
case was then i·ef erred to Judge Elton for further 
nretrial, and extensive pretrial was held at which 
;
0 acts, proposed exhibits and legal theories were 
tboJ\!Ughly discussed and argued. 
Judge Elton ruled as a matter of law as follows: 
L Respondent did not waive any default which 
11ay have occurred. 
S. Tenders made by appellants of $147.00 were 
adequate to cure the def a ult before respondent 
c1eclared the entire debt due. 
3. Return of the $147.00 check twice by re-
spondent together with respondent's letters to appel-
lants of December 14, 1964, December 28, 1964, and 
January 6, 1965, was adequate notice to appellants 
that respondent would require strict performance. 
4. Appellants had been given reasonable time 
to comply with respondent's demands for strict per-
formance but had not performed and showed that 
they did not intend to do so. 
V..f e shall now examine the rulings of Judge 
Elton to see if the undisputed facts support these 
rulings: 
1. RESPONDENT DID NOT WAIVE ANY DEFAULT 
vVHICH MAY HA VE OCCURRED. 
The letters from respondent to appellants of 
December 14, 1964 (Exhibit P-4) December 28, 
7 
1964, (Exhibit P-5) and January 6 1965 (E h' . ,
1 
' ' X Ibit ' P-6) express a demand for strict performance· 
1 . ~~ 
ing payment of late charges and adequate month!. 
payments toward taxes and insurance and not Y 
election by respondent to collect a late charge 
1
·n 1,an . ~ 
of_acceleratmg as contended by appellants. Acceler. 
at10n came as a consequence of appellants' failure 
to meet the demand for strict performance. These , 
three letters with the return of the $147.00 tender 
taken together, cannot under any construction b~ 1 
deemed a waiver but constitute a clear, unmistak. 
able demand for performance according to the agret. 
ment. This was the basis of Judge Elton's ruling. 
One other point, though hardly worthy of att€n-
tion, should be dealt with briefly so the Court will 
know it has not been overlooked. Appellants con. 
tend that they received a demand for payment of the 
December 15, 1964, payment together with a demand 
for payment of a late charge from respondent on or 
about December 23, 1966 (R. 127, 128) and that 
such demand constituted a waiver by respondent of 
its acceleration. 
It is a curious thing that it took until the day 
of the trial for this interesing exhibit to come forth, 
especially since it had been in the file of appellants' 
attorney all the time since received (R. 127),.and I 
after extensive pretrial proceedings over a consider· I 
able period of time at which all legal theories, facts ( 
and documents had been thoroughly discussed. I 
Respondent denies that what appellants received 
1
1 
8 
was a demand for payment and that it had the effect 
claimed for it by appellants of waiving acceleration 
cf the obligation. 
~. TENDERS MADE BY APPELLANTS OF $147.00 
WERE NOT ADEQUATE TO CURE THE DEFAULT 
BEFORE RESPONDENT DECLARED THE ENTIRE 
DEBT DUE. 
The mortgage provides that together with and 
in addition to the monthly payments of principal and 
:nterest payable under the terms of the note secured 
thereby, the mortgagor will pay to the mortgagee, 
each month until the note is fully paid, a sum for 
fire insurance premiums and taxes, all as estimated 
by the mortgagee, etc. (Exhibit P-2). The mortgage 
further provides: "If default be made in any agree-
ment herein contained, or in the payment of any 
money hereby secured -, the mortgagee, -, may 
without prior notice or demand declare the entire 
indebtedness due and foreclose this mortgage -." 
The mortgage further states that it is made for 
the purpose of securing prompt payment of the note, 
according to its tenor. The tenor of the note calls 
for monthly payment of principal and interest and 
further provides for payment of a stated collection 
charge (late fee) to cover additional cost of handling 
any monthly payment made more than 10 days after 
it is due. In other words, the collection charge or 
late fee, when incurred, is as much a part of the 
obligation secured by the mortgage as are the prin-
cipal and interest. 
9 
The monthly payment to be made by th . 1 
gagor to the mortgagee of a sum fol' pa e 11101 t· 
t d . . · Yl11ent of axes an msurance is a covenant by the 
11 
·t 
11 101 gagor appe ant; the amount of the monthly pay
1 
t . 
b " . d b 11en i0 
.e. as estimate y the mortgagee" respondent. Th, 
failure by the mortgago1 to make these lJay111 't .' e1, s E 
a breach of an agreement of the mortgage and bi: 
the terms of the mortgage itself gives the mortga · 
the right to declare the entire indebtedness due;:~ 
foreclose the mortgage. · 
In the absence of a showing that the inC!'ease 
of $2.00 per month was capricious or arbitrary, the 
mortgagor should be bound by the increase. Appel-
lants for 11 months had refused to increase the 
monthly payment into the tax and insurance resern 
by $2.00 and disputed respondent's right to increase 
the amount (R. 19, 91), even though, when the 1964 
taxes were paid by respondent, there 1rns not enougn 
money in the reserve account to pay the taxes and , 
this necessitated respondent's advancing $44.07 to 1, 
pay the taxes (R. 119), and left nothing in the 
reserve account toward fire insurance premium. 
Appellants contend failure to pay the late 
charges and failure to pay the full amount estimated 
by respondent into reserve for taxes and insurance 
does not give respondent the right to accelerate the i' 
unpaid balance. Reduced to its simplest term~, 
1 
appellants' argument is that appellants coul~ c~m­
pletely ignore accrued late charges and the obhgat10n 
to pay taxes so long as appellants paid the monthly (
1 
10 
I 
I 
installment of principal and interest when due, that 
respondent could not accelerate the obligation; and 
further, that respondent would have to pay the taxes 
2nd/or insurance and then demand reimbursement 
fr1Jm appellants and be refused before respondent 
could accelerate. Such a conclusion does violence to 
the elem·, expressed language of the agreement be-
tween the parties in the form of the note and mort-
gage. 
Appellants cite and rely upon the case of Home-
on11er.s Loan Corp v. Washington (1945 Utah) 180 
l'. 469, 161 P.2d 355, involving foreclosure of a 
n:ortgage which contains some language similar to 
some of the language of the mortgage in this case 
ai:d which case held that where the note and mort-
gage required payment by the mortgagee of taxes 
and assessments and demand for repayment before 
it could declare a forfeiture, the mortgagee would 
have to comply with the terms of the instruments 
to create those rights. 
In that case, however, there is nothing to show 
that the mortgage provided, as does the mortgage 
in our case, that the mortgagor had agreed to make 
monthly payments to mortgagee toward taxes and 
failed to do so. Because of this, the Homeowners 
Loan case is not determinative or even helpful in the 
problem here. 
Appellants claim respondent waived its right 
to obect to the purported insufficiency of the tender 
11 
made on or about December 21 1964 b f .. 
. l d d , , Y ailing t inc u e a em~nd for the December 15, 1964 ~J 
ment and to raise any objection in the letter f, P.ay. 
f (E h.b. 0 reJec 10n x i it P-5) and then cite 78-27-3, Utahc · 
Annotated, regarding objection to tender. ode 
Respondent's letters to appellants ( P-4 p 
5 
, 
, - anl' 
P-6). set forth precisely what amount of money wa; 
reqmred and why the tenders were refused and th 
partial payment would not be acceptable. This cm~'. 
plies with the requirement of the statute. 
Certainly on January 6, 1965, respondent had 
the right to demand payment of the November 15. 
1964, and the December 15, 1964, payments which 
it did in its letter of that date. Neverless, the 
tender and only tender made by appellants in re-
sponse to that letter was on January 8, 1965, of 
$147.00 which was not even enough to pay the No. 
vember 15, 1964, payment. 
It must therefore follow that in the absence of 
a modification of the agreement between the parties 
in the f orrn of the note and mortgage, the tender 
by appellant of $147.00 was never an adequate tender 
of what was then due respondent. 
3. RETURN OF THE $147.00 CHECK TWICE BY RE· 
SPONDENT, TOGETHER WITH RESPONDENT'S 
LETTERS TO APPELLANTS OF DECEMBER 14, 
1964, DECEMBER 28, 1964, AND JANUARY 6, 1965, 
WAS ADEQUATE NOTICE TO APPELLANTS THAT 
RESPONDENT WOULD REQUIRE STRICT PER· 
FORMAN CE. 
Respondent recognizes the validity of the legal 
12 
i 
I 
I. 
proposition, and the cases cited in support thereof 
in appellants' brief, that where the mortgagee has 
repeatedly accepted late payments from the mort-
gagor, leading the latter to ?elieve that strict per-
formance would not be required, a duty is imposed 
on the mortgagee of giving to the mortgagor a 
reasonable notice before the mortgagee may insist 
on strict performance by the mortgagor in the future. 
Respondent believes that such a reasonable notice 
had been given. 
Admittedly, there had been a history of late 
payments and of respondent's tolerating them. There 
had also been a history of appellants' ignoring their 
obligation to pay collection charges or late fees and 
ignoring the request that they increase the monthly 
payments toward taxes and insurance. 
On December 14, 1964, respondent made de-
mand upon appellants to pay the November 15, 1964, 
monthly payment plus $22.00 accrued through 11 
payments being $2.00 short toward taxes and in-
surance and the 14 accrued late charges, and stating 
that partial payment would not be accepted (Exhibit 
P-4). This demand was clear, but standing alone, it 
may not have been adequate notice that respondent 
would accelerate the obligation. But coupled with 
the return of the $14 7. 00 tender and the letter of 
December 28, 1964 (P-5) and the second return 
of the $147.00 tender and the letter of January 6, 
1965 (P-6) again stating the amount due and de-
manding immediate payment of this amount, there 
13 
could be no doubt in the mind of an ordina, 
bl 1 Y, reaso ' a e man that respondent would demand st.· n. 
f Th . 1 i1ct Pel' , ormance. is etter of January 6 1965 · 
th t f 11 · . ' ' state, a u reqmred rennttance must reach · ' 
' ff. . . respond 
ent s o ice immediately if additional expen · . . ~~ 
inconvemence are to be eliminated. The onl, d 
1 t. 1 . Ya r11. 
iona expense and mconvenience that could resul 
was acceleration and foreclosure, and this is the cor'. 
sequence respondent is warning appellants of in thi~ 
letter. ' 
Appellants cite the case of Pacific DeDelopmn
1
t 
Conipany v. Stewart, (Utah 1948) 113 U. 403, 19.i 
P.2d 7 48, and quote Justice Pratt, speaking for the 
Court on page 750 as follows: "There is no question 
that the acceptance by the seller of the buyers' past 
due p2,yrnents and its other conduct toward the 
buyers leading the latter to believe that strict per. 
f on11ance would not be required by the seller, imposes 
upon the seller the duty of giving to the buyer a 
reasonable notice before it may insist on strict per-
f orrnance by the buyers." 
This is a fair statement of the law applicable in 
our case, although that case involved forfeiture of 
buyers' interest under a real estate contract. That 
case further says at page 750: "Though seller's con· 
duct may have lead the buyers to believe that the 
seller would not insist on prompt payments being 
made, nothing about its actions should have ~ead 
them to believe that seller had permanently waived 
its right to declare a forfeiture of whatever interest 
14 
buyers had in the contract; nothing in the terms of 
th~ contract, or the acts of the parties, indicate an 
intention to penalize the seller for leniency." 
Appellants cite the case of Brown v. Hewitt 
'1940 Tex. Civ. App.) 143 SW2d 223, as authority ~or the proposition that a lender who had accepted 
from borrower overdue installments on a note would 
not be permitted suddenly to revert to the terms of 
ihe note so as to enforce an optional acceleration 
clause without first giving borrower specific notice 
of his intention. This case says nothing about notice 
of specific intention to accelerate. What it does say 
and what it stands for is that a holder of a note and 
deed of trust could not accelerate maturity of the 
entire indebtednes for failure to pay monthly install-
ments on the due date, where the holder did not 
afford the maker an opportunity to pay installments 
before acceleration, and the installment was paid a 
few days late according to usual course of dealing 
of the parties. 
What more emphatic demonstration could there 
be that respondent required strict performance than 
its refusing less than strict performance, returning 
the tender of an amount less than strict performance 
and demanding in clear language what was required! 
4. APPELLANTS HAD BEEN GIVEN REASONABLE 
TIME TO COMPLY WITH RESPONDENT'S DE-
MANDS FOR STRICT PERFORMANCE BUT HAD 
NOT PERFORMED AND SHOWED THAT THEY 
DID NOT INTEND TO DO SO. 
Appellants were given notice of respondent's 
15 
demand by the letter of December 14 1964 ' , and c1 not perform. This demand was repeated b t' 1111 
t D b Y he let er on ecem er 28, 1964, and again no perf · 
t h ~~ o meet t e demand. This was repeated a third r t : 
by the letter of January 6 1965. Again t d JllJµ ' , en er , 
only part of what was due. Thereafter on Ja 
1
1t , nuai-· 
8, 1965, respondent declared the entire debt due an'
1 
payable. a 
The time from December 14, 1964, when de.' 
mand for strict performance was first made to Janu. 
a:y 8, 1965, when respo~dent accelerated the obliga. 1 
tion, was not a long period, and standing alone afttr 
a long history of late payments, might raise a ques- . 
tion whether this was a reasonable time for appel-
lants to perform strictly according to the terms of 
the note and morgage. In other words, if appellants 
had done nothing after receiving respondent's de-
mands, it might well be a legal question whether 
appellants were given a reasonable time. The actions 
of the appellants, however, eliminate this question. 
Three times the appellants tendered less than tne 
amount due and demanded. This can have no mean· 
ing other than that appellants did not intend to mah 1 
payment to comply with the demands for strict per· r 
f ormance of the agreement. This conduct by appel· 
lants indicated that the amount of time in this ca.11 i 
would make no difference. Such conduct demon· 
started that appellants intended to continue their j 
prior course, to ignore their obligation to pay la\t ', 
charges and the increase in monthly payments t.() 
1 
16 
! ,, 
ward taxes and insurance to make the payment ade-
quate, to ignore making the December 15, 1964, 
,1ayment as demanded, and that appellants chose to ~lispute respondent's right to assess late charges and 
to increase the monthly payment toward taxes and 
insurance regardles of the amount needed to pay 
these i terns. 
In the case of Pacific Development Company v. 
Stewart (1948 Utah) 195 P.2d 748, cited supra, 
the Court further states: "Where the facts sur-
rounding the transaction are undisputed, as they are 
in this case, this Court may determine, as a matter 
of law, what is a reasonable time. We hold that 23 
days was a reasonable time to allow defendants to 
make up the overdue payments under the circum-
stances of this case." Respondent's letters of Decem-
ber 14, 1964 (Exhibit P-4) December 28, 1964 
(Exhibit P-5) and January 6, 1965 (Exhibit P-6) 
express a demand for strict performance including 
payment of late charges and adequate monthly pay-
ments for taxes and insurance, and not an election 
by respondent to collect a late charge in lieu of 
accelerating as contended by appellants. Accelera-
tion came as a consequence of appellants' failure to 
meet the demand for strict performance, not as a 
result of respondent's suddenly shifting its position 
as contended by the appellants. The only shift by 
respondent was that after an unsatisfactory history 
of receiving payments late and of appellants' ignor-
ing late charges which had accrued and of ignoring 
17 
the increase for taxes and insurance i·es d 
' Pon ent' three letters to appellants demanded ' in 
. . Pay111eir" 
strictly accordmg to the terms of the note d le 
an 111ort. gage. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court was confronted with the applica. 
ti on of the law of these undisputed facts: The hor. 
rower generally made payments late, complete!\' 
ignored the obligation to pay late charges and th~ 
obligation to pay an adequate monthly amount to-
ward taxes and insurance as estimated by the lender. 
the lender made three written demands upon the 
borrower for strict performance setting forth in 
itemized form or specific amounts what was de-
manded, ref used to accept less than strict perform. 
ance, and the borrower failed and refused to comply 
with these demands. 
The trial Court arrived at the only decision it 
could have under these circumstances, that there 
was a default which had not been waived, that ' 
reasonable notice of the requirement of strict per-
formance was given, that there was no compliance, 
that the respondent had the right to accelerate the 
obligaion and obtain a judgment of foreclosure. 
• I 
Under these facts, it is clear there was no JU111 ' 
question, and the judgment of the trial Court, de-
18 
cided as a matter of law, that respondent was en-
titled to a decree of foreclosure should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A.H. BOYCE 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
400 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 355-2886 
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